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1 Introduction
Over the course of development, the variety of productive activities in the economy tends to
increase in conjunction with the aggregate stock of capital and output. This observation implies
that economic development manifests itself partly as a process of sectoral diversication and
increasing specialisation within the economy, an idea that dates back to Adam Smith (1776) in
his discussion of the division of labour and its relation with the size of the market (The Wealth
of Nations, chapter 3). Such a dynamic pattern is also described by Allyn Young (1928, p. 537),
who writes "industrial di¤erentiation has been and remains the type of change characteristically
associated with the growth of production." Similarly, Landes (1969, p. 5) argues that the most
evident e¤ects brought about by the Industrial Revolution were the gains in productivity and
the increase in the variety of products and occupations.
I propose a theory in which this process of sectoral diversication helps to mitigate informa-
tional frictions a¤ecting the operation of nancial markets. Furthermore, the degree of sectoral
variety is itself endogenous to the theory, and it is positively inuenced by nancial markets.
As a result, sectoral di¤erentiation and the operation of nancial markets appear interrelated
in the model, and this positive interaction becomes a key feature that shapes the patterns of
development followed by di¤erent economies.
The paper studies the evolution of an economy populated by heterogeneously talented in-
dividuals. In particular, individuals are characterised by distinct intrinsic skills concerning
di¤erent types of entrepreneurial activities. A key assumption is that these skills are private
information. In such a context, when agents need credit to start up their projects, asymmet-
ric information gives rise to an adverse selection problem linked to the allocation of skills and
prevents the provision of e¢ cient credit contracts to talented entrepreneurs.
The modelled economy is constituted by di¤erent productive sectors. Each of these sectors
represents a particular industry or activity, and requires the application of some specic types of
entrepreneurial skills. The appearance of new sectors is assumed to be the result of R&D e¤ort
and innovations. This assumption reects the idea that carrying out new productive activities
requires rst an increase in the stock of knowledge in the society.
The central point in this paper rests on the hypothesis that sectoral variety allows improve-
ments in the self-selection of talents to sectors. This fact reduces the severity of the adverse
selection problem in the credit market, enabling the provision of more satisfactory credit con-
tracts to talented agents, which fosters their entrepreneurial investment. The impact of sectoral
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variety on the operation of credit market, in turn, gives rise to a positive feedback between nan-
cial development and innovation activities. Entrepreneurs are the agents who put innovations
into practice in the economy. This means that the return to entrepreneurial investment is what
ultimately determines the size of the market for innovations and the returns to R&D e¤ort. As a
result, when talented entrepreneurs receive better credit contracts this also raises the incentives
to undertake R&D, while higher investment in R&D contributes to nancial development (by
expanding the variety of sectors and enabling better sorting).
Based on this setup, I present two main ndings. First, there is a static e¢ ciency result
related to the degree of sectoral diversication: a larger variety of sectors helps to lessen the
informational frictions in the credit market a¤ecting talented entrepreneurs. In particular, given
the heterogeneity of skills, sectoral variety allows better matching of agents to activities, which
in turn raises the quality of the pool of credit applicants. In that regard, adverse selection here
stems from an underlying problem of relative scarcity of sectors, because this hinders the e¢ cient
sorting of (unobservable) talents. When the variety of sectors is limited, a large number of agents
have no other choice but to specialise in activities for which they might not be exceptionally
talented. Asymmetric information concerning skills, in turn, spreads the negative consequences
of low-productivity matches to other sectors in the economy, since it prevents the (ex-ante)
screening of heterogeneous agents in the credit market. In other words, those agents who are
not able to exploit their advantage inict a negative externality (through the adverse selection
problem) on those who, in principle, could exercise fully their intrinsic skills.
Second, from a dynamic perspective, the paper shows that some economies might follow suc-
cessful development paths, while others might get trapped in an underdevelopment equilibrium.
In the former case, development is characterised by a continuous process of sectoral di¤erentia-
tion. In addition, alongside development and expanding diversication, the allocation of talent
improves and, concomitantly, the adverse selection problem preventing talented entrepreneurs
from receiving e¢ cient credit contracts is progressively mitigated. On the other hand, in the
poverty trap, economies exhibit a rudimentary productive structure, with few active industries,
and highly ine¢ cient nancial institutions. In that sense, the poverty trap is the result of a
general organisational failure in the economy, leading to the collapse of several markets.
The idea that the e¢ ciency of the credit market may be inuenced and by agentspayo¤s
in other markets of the economy is already present in Ghatak, Morelli and Sjöström (2007). In
particular, their model exploits an interesting general equilibrium feedback between the credit
market and the labour market: when the economy is able to provide high wages, low-quality
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entrepreneurs nd themselves better o¤ selling their labour in the market. As a result, as a side
e¤ect, high wages help to "clean" the pool of credit applicants, reducing informational frictions
and enabling better operation of the credit market which in turn helps sustaining high wages.1
Like Ghatak et al, I study the sorting of talents in a context of informational asymmetries.
A new aspect of my model is that it integrates the ensuing credit market imperfection within a
multi-sectoral endogenous growth model. Innovation and the expansion of the set of activities
in the economy become thus key features of the model, since they allow an improved sorting of
skills to sectors. Two new ndings result from my model compared to Ghatak et al. First, it
shows that innovation improves the assignment of skills, which in turn feeds back on innovation
by increasing the returns to R&D. Second, it highlights a new role for the innovation process,
very di¤erent from the one traditionally stressed in the growth literature. Innovations are not
only desirable because they directly augment the productivity of inputs, but also because they
may help to mitigate frictions in nancial markets. From that perspective, this paper is also
contributing to the literature on sectoral variety and growth by proposing an additional channel
whereby increased variety promotes development.2
Sectoral diversication as a factor leading to nancial development is also studied by Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (1997). They propose a growth model with technological indivisibilities
where the degree of market incompleteness tends to disappear with capital accumulation, allow-
ing better risk sharing of idiosyncratic shocks and, thus, further enhancing capital accumulation
by risk-averse entrepreneurs. In my model, although nancial development is aided by the level
of sectoral diversication too, this is the result of a di¤erent mechanism: the alleviation of
agency costs faced by talented entrepreneurs as the sorting of skills to activities improves when
the variety of sectors expands. In a related contribution, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) study
the evolution of informational asymmetries and agentsperformances over the development path.
1See also De Meza and Webb (2000) for another model where agentsoutside options inuence the e¢ ciency
of the credit market. Unlike Ghatak et al (2007), though, in their paper the value of agentsoutside options are
exogenously set.
2Sectoral di¤erentiation has traditionally been considered to raise aggregate productivity by two distinct
channels: 1) permitting the exploitation of economies of scale through increasing specialisation (e.g., Smith (1776),
Young (1928), Romer (1990), Yang and Borland (1991), Jones (2008)); 2) enabling heterogeneously skilled agents
to obtain a better match (e.g., Rosen (1978), Miller (1984), Kim (1989)). The contribution of this paper to that
literature is then to show that sectoral di¤erentiation brings about an additional positive e¤ect on growth via
improved sorting, because an increasing variety of activities helps to lessen the negative consequences of adverse
selection linked to the allocation of skills.
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However, they focus on how a society manages to provide correct incentives to agents, and how
incentives may become more e¤ective as an economy grows. My paper instead studies how
the assignment of heterogeneous skills evolves during development in a context of endogenous
variety expansion.
Finally, the present paper is also closely related to the literature on nancial market im-
perfections and poverty e.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Piketty
(1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyds-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), Mookherjee and Ray
(2002), and Ghatak and Jiang (2002). These articles stress the inuence of wealth distribution
on the dynamic behaviour of the economy when agency costs lead to credit rationing. My paper
contributes to this literature mainly through two di¤erent channels. It rst provides an alter-
native micro-founded explanation (involving multiple sectors and multi-market interactions) of
why agency costs in the credit market may arise in a developing economy. Secondly, it is able
to generate dynamics whereby these agency costs are alleviated as an economy develops and
sectoral diversication takes place.
Section 2 describes the basic setup of the model. Section 3 studies the static equilibrium of
the economy; in particular it analyses the entrepreneursoptimal choice in the presence of adverse
selection. Section 4 introduces the innovation activities into the model, which endogenises the
variety of sectors in the economy. Section 5 proceeds to the dynamic analysis of this economy.
Section 6 discusses an important extension to the basic model. Section 7 presents and discusses
some stylised facts consistent with the main predictions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
2 Environment
The paper considers a small economy enjoying full access to international nancial markets. Life
evolves over a discrete-time innite horizon, t = f0; 1; :::;1g. In each period t a single-period
lived continuum of agents with mass normalised to 1 is alive.
There exist in the economy a continuum of sectors indexed by the letter i 2 [0; 1]. Each
sector i represents a particular industry where a nal good may be produced. The set of sectors
[0; 1] is constant over time; however, not all sectors are necessarily active at any moment in
time. In particular, at time t only a fraction nt of all sectors are able to enjoy the activity of
productive industries. Hereafter, At  [0; 1] will denote the set of sectors with active industries
at time t. The set At has Lesbegue measure nt.
The availability of productive industries is assumed to be the result of innovations (either
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generated during the past or in the present). This reects the idea that in order to produce
a new type of good, it is rst required to generate the knowledge needed to produce this new
good.3 Once the activity that corresponds to sector i is available, it never disappears (i.e., if
sector i 2 At, then sector i 2 At+ 8  0). To ease notation, henceforth I skip the use of
time-subscripts when creating no confusion. Sectors belonging to A will be referred to as active
sectors (and the remaining sectors will accordingly be called inactive sectors).
A sector i 2 A provides the agents in the economy the chance to invest in an entrepreneurial
project: Project-i. The return of Project-i is random, subject to an idiosyncratic shock. Project-
is return also depends on the application of some specic entrepreneurial skills, and on the
amount of capital invested in the project. A full description of Project-i is provided in the
following subsection (equations (1) and (2) ahead in the text).
2.1 Entrepreneurs
At any time t, there exists a continuum of (prospective) entrepreneurs who are indexed by the
letter i 2 [0; 1]. Henceforth, the entrepreneur i will also be referred to as the type i.
The cohort-t of entrepreneurs is alive during period t. A new cohort is born just at the end of
the previous cohorts lifespan. Each (dying) entrepreneur procreates one (new) entrepreneur. For
the moment, I assume agents are non-altruistic and are born with zero initial wealth (in Section
6 this assumption is relaxed). All entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, sharing identical preferences
over consumption.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial skills. More precisely,
if type j 2 [0; 1] invests k units of capital in Project-i, then his Project-is gross return (yi;j) is
given by:
yi;j = i;j f(ki;j):
The function f(k) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and
satises Inada conditions. The variable ki;j represents the amount of capital invested in Project-i
by type j. Capital fully depreciates during the process of production. Finally, i;j denotes the
realisation of a random variable with support f0; 1g. The value taken by i;j is drawn from the
3The concept of innovation should be understood here in a relatively broad sense. In particular, by innovation,
I will either refer to the creation of a totally new activity (i.e., an invention), or to the generation of the additional
knowledge that is required in order to bring and apply into the local economy technologies that are already
available elsewhere. As it will become clear later on, what is crucial in our model is the fact that both types of
innovation activities are costly in terms of local R&D e¤ort.
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following distribution function:
i;j =
8<: 1 with probability pi;j0 with probability 1  pi;j ;
where,
pi;j = 1 for all i; j 2 [0; 1] if j = i;
pi;j = p 2 (0; 1) for all i; j 2 [0; 1] if j 6= i:
In short, type i is an agent with intrinsic advantage in Project-i.4 Gross returns of Project-i are
thus given by:
yi;i = f(ki;i) (1)
yi;j(i;j) =
8<: f(ki;j) with probability p0 with probability 1  p , where j 6= i (2)
Diversication among entrepreneurial projects is not feasible. In other words, agents must
specialise in, at most, one particular project.
Concerning the informational structure in the economy, entrepreneurial types are assumed
private information. Project outcomes, on the contrary, are publicly observable. In addition
to that, I assume types are intergenerationally uncorrelated, implying that parentshistorical
outcomes provide no information whatsoever about the type of a child.
Lastly, I assume that everybody has access to a "backyard" activity which requires no initial
investment and yields net return equal to v with certainty. Without loss of generality, I set v = 0
(implying that the corresponding participation constraint will never bind).5
2.2 Innovations
Before deciding in which activity to specialise, an entrepreneur may choose to undertake some
(costly) R&D e¤ort in order to turn a previously inactive sector into an active sector (i.e., an
4Strictly speaking, this is an absolute advantage. The model could actually assume a comparative advantage
by each agent i in each sector i (for example, by assuming that pi;i > pi;j for all i and i 6= j, but with those
probabilities di¤ering across agents and with some agents displaying higher average success probabilities). This
alternative setup would not alter the main insights of the paper. However, assuming an absolute advantage in
one specic sector (and symmetric across agents) substantially simplies the operation of the model.
5 If v > 0, agents would have access to an outside option with positive payo¤, hence their participation constraint
may bind in equilibrium. This might have some minor implications on the type of credit contracts observed in
equilibrium, however, none of the main results and insights of the paper would be altered by letting v > 0.
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entrepreneur alive in t may try to generate the knowledge required to turn some sector i =2 At 1
into an active sector in t). Whether or not an entrepreneur undertakes such R&D e¤ort (and
how much of it) will be part of his optimisation problem. More precisely, the optimal level of
R&D e¤ort will be the result of comparing the returns he expects to get from having the chance
to specialise in the newly created activity versus the costs involved by that. To simplify the
exposition, the explicit introduction of innovation e¤ort will be postponed until Section 4.
2.3 Credit Markets
Since agents in the economy are born with zero wealth, they will need to rely on credit markets
in order to undertake their investment projects. The rest of the world will provide local agents
with the needed funds. All credit market transactions with the rest of the world are mediated by
some rms called nancial intermediaries. The local credit market is characterised by free-entry
and absence of set-up or sunk costs. Since the economy is small and there is perfect international
capital mobility, nancial intermediaries are able to draw liquid funds from international credit
markets facing a perfectly elastic supply at the international (net) interest rate Rf . In the sake
of algebraic simplicity, let Rf = 0.
Financiers will o¤er loan contracts stipulating the payment to be made to them, conditional
on the outcome of the entrepreneurial project. Individuals in the economy are protected by
limited liability. As a result, since in the event of failure projects yield zero output, entrepre-
neurs will be able to pay back a positive amount to the nanciers only in the case of success.
Equilibrium loan contracts will thus display the following structure: (lj ; rj) 2 R+  R+, where
lj represents the loan extended to type j and rj stands for the (net) interest rate charged on lj
in the event of success. In other words, the entrepreneur j must pay back lj(1 + rj) in the state
of success, while if the project fails he goes bankrupt and the nancier recovers 0 income.6
3 Static Equilibrium Analysis
Throughout this section the set of active sectors At is taken as exogenously given. Thus, this
section focuses on the optimal behaviour of the entrepreneurs, and on the set of credit contracts
o¤ered by the nancial intermediaries, given At. In the next sections I proceed to study the
6Nothing in the model would change if entrepreneurs raised capital by issuing equity, as each share will pay zero
in the event of failure and a strictly positive dividend in the event of success that is identical for all entrepreneurial
projects.
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dynamic evolution of the economy; this will require explicitly incorporating the innovation e¤ort
undertaken by the entrepreneurs into their optimal plans.
Let Ct denote the set of credit contracts o¤ered by nancial intermediaries in period t. An
entrepreneur j 2 [0; 1] alive during t will choose an allocation [(rj ; lj); ki;j : i 2 At], solving the
following two-stage optimisation problem:
 Specialisation-stage: j 2 [0; 1] selects sector i 2 At in which to invest.
 Investment-stage:7
max
ki;j ;(rj ;lj)
: Ei(Uj) = pi;j max f0 ; f(ki;j)  (1 + rj)lj + (lj   ki;j)g
+ (1  pi;j) max f0 ;  (1 + rj)lj + (lj   ki;j)g (I)
subject to: ki;j  lj (budget constraint),
ki;j  0 (feasibility constraint),
(rj ; lj) 2 Ct (set of o¤ered credit contracts).
Given the set At, in equilibrium, the entrepreneurial allocations f(rj ; lj); ki;j : i 2 Atgj2[0;1]
and the set of o¤ered credit contracts Ct must satisfy the following two conditions:
1) Entrepreneurs optimal allocation: Given the set Ct, for all j alive in period t, the
allocation f(rj ; lj); ki;j : i 2 Atg solves the two-stage optimisation problem (I).
2) Credit markets (competitive) equilibrium: (i) No credit contract belonging to Ct makes
negative expected prots; and (ii) there exists no other feasible credit contract z, such that z =2
Ct, and which, if o¤ered in addition to Ct, would make positive expected prots.
3.1 Credit Market Equilibrium Contracts
Following the literature on adverse selection in nancial markets (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), Wilson (1977), and Milde and Riley (1988)), one would reasonably expect two di¤erent
kinds of equilibria to possibly arise in this models credit market: 1) a pooling equilibrium, in
which all types receive an identical credit contract; 2) a separating equilibrium, in which types
receive distinctive contracts that induce self-revelation of their (unobservable) skills.
7Ei(Uj) denotes the expected utility of type j when he invests in Project-i (recall that the success probability
pi;j depends on the match between the type and the sector).
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Lemma 1 Assume the set of inactive sectors at time t is non-empty (i.e., At 6= [0; 1]). Take
any sector i 2 At and any sector j =2 At. Then, there can never exist an equilibrium at t in
which type i and type j choose di¤erent credit contracts.
Lemma 1 means that there cannot exist a separating equilibrium in this model. As a conse-
quence, if an equilibrium is to exist at all, it should entail pooling credit contracts. This result
stems from the conjunction of four di¤erent assumptions: i) risk-neutrality, ii) the limited-
liability constraint, iii) agents being born with zero initial wealth (so they can place no collat-
eral), and iv) the fact that the outside option yields v = 0. Intuitively, given a set of credit
contracts, any contract that maximises net returns for (1) must also necessarily maximise ex-
pected net returns for (2) (since, in the presence of limited liability and no collateral, expected
net returns when (2) holds are proportional to net returns when (1) prevails).8
Given the set of active sectors at time t, At  [0; 1], we may split the population alive
during t in two disjoint subsets: the rst subset composed by all those types-i 2 [0; 1], such that
sector i 2 At; the second one by all those types-j 2 [0; 1], such that sector j =2 At. The rst
group of agents would be able to exploit fully their intrinsic skills, whereas the second one have
to specialise in a sector for which they are not (exceptionally) talented. Abusing a bit of the
language utilised in the adverse selection literature, I will call the rst group the good types,
while the second group will be denoted as the bad types.9
In a pooling equilibrium, all entrepreneurs receive an identical credit contract Ct = (l; r).
Additionally, in any (competitive) pooling equilibrium, credit contracts must necessarily verify
the following two properties. First, the contract must make non-negative expected prots;
otherwise this contract would simply be withdrawn. Second, the contract must maximise the
expected utility of the good types; otherwise nanciers could o¤er a di¤erent contract such that
it makes non-negative prots and, at the same time, it makes these agents better o¤.
8See Ghatak, Morelli and Sjöström (2007), and also Grüner (2003), for models that obtain pooling contracts
in a similar fashion. Pooling contracts are especially attractive in this context because they lead to a very neat
and smooth characterisation of the main results of this paper. Yet, pooling contracts, and in particular the
assumptions required for pooling to arise, are by no means crucial. What is essential here is the fact that as more
sectors become active and the matching of skills improves, the informational frictions a¤ecting the most talented
entrepreneurs in the credit market are eased.
9More rigorously: good typest = fh 2 [0; 1] j sector h 2 Atg and bad typest = fh 2 [0; 1] jsector h =2 Atg.
Notice that in this paper whether a particular Type-h 2 [0; 1] is a good type or a bad type is not xed, but it is
contingent of the set At. In that sense, from a dynamic point of view, everyone could eventually become a good
type, if the set of active sectors constantly expands over time.
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Assume for the moment that type i chooses to specialise in sector i 2 A (as it will be-
come clear later on, this will necessarily be true in equilibrium). Then, given Ct = (l; r), his
optimisation problem boils down to:
max
ki;i0
: max f0 ; f(ki;i)  (1 + r)l + (l   ki;i)g (I)
s:t : ki;i  l (budget constraint).
Note now that because r  0 (otherwise nanciers would make losses on entrepreneurial loans),
entrepreneurs will borrow only with the intention to invest in a project. As a consequence,
ki;i = l will hold in the optimum and Problem (I) will yield:
f 0(k) = (1 + r) (3)
From (3), we can then obtain the optimal amount of capital invested in the project, given the
interest rate r. That is, k(r); where k0(r) < 0 since f 00() < 0. An equilibrium pooling contract
will, therefore, display the following structure: (l; r) = (k(r); r).
3.2 The Equilibrium Interest Rate
The pair (k(r); r) characterises the equilibrium credit contract, given the interest rate r. There-
fore, in order to determine the exact credit contract that holds in t, it still remains to nd the
equilibrium value of r in t. Let us denote this variable by rt .
Consider sector i 2 At and suppose the type i alive in t decides to invest in Project-i. Then,
given r, his consumption (ci;i) would be determined by:
ci;i = f(k
(r))  (1 + r)k(r): (4)
Now, suppose this type i chooses to invest in Project-x 2 At, where x 6= i. In that case, his
consumption (cx;i) would be given by cx;i = p [f(k(r))  (1 + r)k(r)] : Since ci;i > cx;i, then,
as long as sector i 2 At this type i will specialise in Project-i.
Consider now sector j =2 At and the type j alive in period t. This agent could invest in any
Project-x, such that sector x 2 At, obtaining as expected consumption:
cx;j = p [f(k
(r))  (1 + r)k(r)] : (5)
Since p > 0 the equation (5) yields cx;j > 0, irrespective of the value taken by r. This implies
that it will always be desirable for type j to invest k(r) in Project-x.
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From the previous discussion, it follows that a fraction nt of the population of entrepreneurs
(the good types) will always pay back the nancial intermediaries the agreed amount (1+r)k(r).
On the other hand, the remaining fraction 1 nt (the bad types) will go bankrupt with probability
1   p. Being protected by limited-liability, the bad types are expected to pay back nanciers
only the amount p(1 + r)k(r).
Perfect competition in the credit market naturally implies that nanciers must make zero
prots in equilibrium. The zero-prot condition on entrepreneurial loans is given by: nt (1 +
rt )k(rt ) + (1  nt) p(1 + rt )k(rt ) = (1 +Rf )k(rt ).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium interest rate charged on credit contracts o¤ered to entrepreneurs
is a decreasing function of the fraction of active sectors. More precisely,
rt = r
(nt) =
(1  nt)(1  p)
nt + (1  nt)p : (6)
From (6), it can also be noted that: r(0) = (1  p)=p, r(1) = 0, and r00(nt) > 0.
Proposition 1 represents one the key insights of the paper. A larger number of active sectors
allows better sorting of entrepreneurial skills, which in turn implies that the severity of the
adverse selection problem in the credit market, in terms of cross-subsidisation from good to bad
types, is reduced. Intuitively, as the set At expands, a higher fraction of agents nd it feasible
to specialise in the sector they are most talented at. This lowers the average default rate in
the economy, enabling nanciers to charge a lower interest rate on the loans they extend to
entrepreneurs, without incurring in expected losses.10
3.3 Entrepreneurial Consumption Level / Net Returns
Take again some type i 2 [0; 1], such that sector i 2 A (a good types representative). His
consumption level will be dictated by (4). Denote such consumption level by Ug(r). Then,
di¤erentiating (4) with respect to r, and taking (3) into account, we get:
U 0g(r) =  k(r): (7)
Select now some type j 2 [0; 1], such that sector j =2 A (a bad types representative). His expected
consumption will be given by (5). Hence, letting Ub(r) denote the expected consumption level
of a bad type, we obtain:
U 0b(r) =  p k(r); (8)
10Notice that r represents also the risk premium in the economy. In that regard, it is the risk premium on
entrepreneurial loans that diminishes as n goes up due to the better sorting of talent.
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where derivation of (8) also makes use of (3).
Lemma 2 Let (r)  Ug(r)   Ub(r). Then, (r) > 0 and 0(r) < 0, for all possible values r
may take in equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward from inspection of (7) and (8). The derivative
0(r) < 0 means that good types benet from a fall in the interest rate r more than bad types
do. The reason for this result rests on the fact that good types never go bankrupt, thus they
will appropriate the full reduction in debt cost induced by a lower r. On the other hand, since
bad types go bankrupt with probability (1   p), they will prot from a smaller r only with
probability p < 1. Lemma 2 will play a key role in the computation of the optimal level of R&D
e¤ort.
4 R&D E¤ort, Innovations and Sectoral Variety
I model the appearance of new active sectors as the result of innovations. I will focus only on
horizontal innovations, as those are the kind of innovations that will lead to improvements in
the allocation of agentstalents, which is the key mechanism at work in this theory.
At the beginning of each period t, before selecting their productive specialisation, each
entrepreneur i chooses how much R&D e¤ort to expend. Successful R&D e¤ort materialises in
the creation of a new active sector. In other words, the e¤ect of R&D e¤ort is allowing the
entrepreneur to operate in period t in a sector j =2 At 1. Technology is assumed to be a pure
public good; that is, its use is non-rival and non-excludable. More precisely, once some particular
entrepreneur i decides to run a project in a newly created sector j, the underlying knowledge
becomes readily (and instantly) available to all the other entrepreneurs from t onwards. The
level of R&D e¤ort is assumed to be unobservable to nanciers.11
An innovation could be either interpreted as the invention of a completely new activity or,
alternatively, as the generation of the knowledge required to adapt/apply foreign technologies in
11Even if R&D e¤ort were publicly observable, it is not straightforward that it could be used as a positive signal
to nanciers in this setup. In particular, two features of the model may play against the use of R&D e¤ort as such
a signal. First, all entrepreneurs whose ideal sector is not active at birth are ex-ante identical, and they would
play the same strategy in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Second, the set of entrepreneurs whose ideal sector
is already active at birth is that for whom the incentives to undertake R&D are actually lowest (since they do
not need to open a new sector in order to nd a perfect match). As a consequence, although the exact outcome
will naturally depend on the o¤-equilibrium path beliefs, R&D e¤ort might actually signal nanciers a higher
likelihood to be a bad type rather than a good type.
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the local economy. In relation to this second interpretation, R&D e¤ort could also be thought of
as the costs involved in designing the most appropriate goods (or technologies to produce those
goods) for specic local markets.12
4.1 Optimal R&D E¤ort
Entrepreneurs must expend e¤ort in order to innovate. E¤ort generates disutility. Let i;t denote
the e¤ort cost (measured in units of consumption) spent in R&D activities by entrepreneur i
alive during period t. Additionally, denote by Pr(Ii;t = 1) the probability that the there is an
innovation in sector i =2 At 1 during t.
Since entrepreneur i has an intrinsic advantage in sector i, while he is equally (less) productive
in all other sectors, then all the R&D e¤ort by entrepreneur i (i.e., i;t) is going to be directed
towards sector i. In other words, it will never be optimal for entrepreneur i to expend any e¤ort
in trying to innovate for a sector j 6= i. I assume R&D e¤ort increases the chances to innovate;
in particular (bearing in mind that all i;t will be optimally directed towards sector i):
Pr(Ii = 1) = (i); (9)
where: 0() > 0, 00() < 0, (0) = 0; lim
!1()  1, and lim!0
0() is nite. (The use of time
subscripts on is skipped to ease notation.)
When sector i =2 At 1, entrepreneur i will choose the value of i to maximise the expected
return derived from having the chance to operate in sector i in period t, net of its e¤ort cost.
This return is crucially linked to the gap in expected consumption between good and bad types,
(r(nt)), since a successful innovation in sector i =2 At 1 allows entrepreneur i born in t to nd
an activity for which he is most talented, rather than having to join a sector for which he is not
especially talented.13
Let
_
 t denote the level of R&D e¤ort by all the entrepreneurs belonging the subset  A it 1,
where  A it 1 = f j 2 [0; 1] j j 6= i and sector j =2 At 1g.14 When all innovations generated
12For example, we could think of type i as an entrepreneur satisfying a specic (geographic) market in the
economy. This entrepreneur could either choose to provide them with an already existing good, or actually trying
to design the most appropriate good for this specic market. The former strategy may imply a cheaper alternative
in terms of R&D e¤ort compared to the latter; however, it may also be expected to be less successful in terms of
sales. (An implicit assumption here is that each entrepreneur has a knowledge advantage regarding local markets
compared to the rest of the economy, which they may or may not choose to exploit.)
13 If sector i 2 At 1, then the entrepreneur i alive in t trivially chooses i = 0.
14This
_
 t should actually be a mapping
_
 t :  A it ! [0;1), summarising the choice of  by each entrepreneur
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during t are actually put into practice (which will be true in equilibrium), we can observe that
nt = nt 1 + (
_
 t)(1  nt 1).15 As a result, we may rewrite (r(nt)) = 	(nt 1;
_
 t). Lemma 3
characterises the optimisation problem concerning R&D e¤ort faced by entrepreneur i.
Lemma 3 Consider sector i =2 At 1, and take the entrepreneur i alive during t: He solves:
max
i0
: i;t(i; nt 1;
_
 t) = (i) 	(nt 1;
_
 t)  i (II)
Where the function 	(nt 1;
_
 t) : [0; 1] R+ ! R+ is increasing in both of its arguments. More
precisely: (i) 	0n() > 0;8nt 1 2 [0; 1] and
_
 t  0; and (ii.a) 	0_ () > 0;8nt 1 2 [0; 1) and
_
 t  0, (ii.b) 	0_ () = 0 if nt 1 = 1.
From Lemma 3 it immediately follows that i;t(i; nt 1;
_
 t) is increasing in both nt 1 and
_
 t. Intuitively, since active sectors never revert to inactive, the higher nt 1 is, the higher nt
is expected to be. As a result, relatively high values of nt 1 will tend to be associated with
relatively low levels of rt (Proposition 1). This, in turn, implies that the surplus generated by
innovations, (rt ), is expected to be large (Lemma 2). Similarly, larger values of
_
 t are also
associated with higher nt, leading thus to lower rt and higher (rt ). In this case, the reason is
that a larger
_
 t means more innovations will be generated, raising thus the value of nt (from a
given nt 1). In addition, note 	0_ () > 0 implies that there is a positive externality across R&D
e¤ort by di¤erent entrepreneurs: this externality arises because when an entrepreneur produces
an innovation, the value of nt goes up, which raises the return to innovation (rt ) for all the
other entrepreneurs who are considering to possibly expend positive R&D e¤ort.
Problem (II) leads to the following rst-order condition:
0(i ) 	(nt 1;
_
 t)  1 and i

0(i ) 	(nt 1;
_
 t)  1

= 0 (10)
Proposition 2 Let i  argmaxi

i;t(i; nt 1;
_
 t)
	
. Then, i = 

i (nt 1;
_
 t) : [0; 1]R+ ! R+,
and it exhibits the following two properties: 1) i (nt 1;
_
 t) is (weakly) increasing in nt 1; 2)
i (nt 1;
_
 t) is (weakly) increasing in
_
 t.
Results in Proposition 2 are straightforward implications of Lemma 3 and equation (10).
Intuitively, as @i;t()=@i is increasing in both nt 1 and
_
 t, larger values of these variables will
lead to a higher level of optimal R&D e¤ort.
belonging to  A it . However, in the optimum, they all select the same value of ; hence, a singleton
_
 t turns out
to be su¢ cient to represent their aggregate behaviour.
15This is because: 1) the sectors that were already active in t   1 remain active in t, and 2) a fraction (_ t)
among the inactive sectors in t  1 become active in t.
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The positive impact of nt 1 on i represents the key result of this section. This feature is
the underlying force generating the positive feedback between nancial development and inno-
vation activities proposed here. Essentially, a larger nt 1 is associated with weaker distortions
in the credit market, thereby leading to higher entrepreneurial prot and, more importantly,
higher talent premium. This induces higher R&D e¤ort which, in turn, leads to a faster rate of
innovations, feeding back on nt.
For the remainder of the paper, it proves convenient to restrict the parameters conguration
such that the following two conditions hold:
Assumption 1. 9 n 2 (0; 1); such that: 0(0)	(n; 0) = 1.
Assumption 2. 9n 2 (0; 1), such that: 0(0) lim_!1	(n;_ ) = 1.
Corollary 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then: (i) 8nt 1  n :
_
 t = 0 ) i = 0; (ii) 8nt 1 > n :
i > 0, regardless of the value taken by
_
 t:
Corollary 2 If Assumption 2 holds, then: 8nt 1  n : i = 0, regardless of the value taken by
_
 t. (Notice Lemma 3 implies n < n:)
Figure 1 illustrates the results stated in Proposition 2. The left panel plots i against nt 1,
given four di¤erent values of
_
 t (these values are: 0 <
_
B <
_
A < 1). Analogously, the right
panel plots i against
_
 t, given ve di¤erent values of nt 1 (nA < nB < n < nC < 1). Notice
that the notation in both panels is consistent with each other (i.e., the value
_
A in panel (a)
corresponds to the value
_
A in panel (b), and so on and so forth). Additionally, in Figure 1.b
(although not plotted) for nt 1 = n we should have i (nt 1;
_
 t) = 0 for all values of
_
 t.
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Figure 1: Optimal R&D e¤ort as a function of nt 1 and
_
 t.
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Figure 2: Nash Equilibrium in R&D E¤ort.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium Solution for R&D E¤ort
Figure 1 takes expectations about other entrepreneursbehaviour as given. However, these
expectations, summarised by
_
 t, must be correct in equilibrium, and they play an important role
because R&D e¤ort by a particular entrepreneur exerts a positive externality on the others. More
specically, as stated in Proposition 2, the optimal R&D policy of an entrepreneur positively
depends on
_
 t. As a result, we must restrict the attention only to solutions of Problem (II)
which also represent a Nash Equilibrium (NE) when we consider all entrepreneurs together.
Given the structure of the model, any NE will be symmetric (SNE). The SNE are determined
by the intersections between the 45 line and the curves plotted in Figure 1.b. For some
ranges of nt 1 2 (n; 1), the model might lead to multiple SNE.16 Equilibrium multiplicity may
arise because R&D e¤orts are subject to strategic complementarity (Cooper and John (1988)).
Figure 2 shows two possible SNE schedules as a function of nt 1 (only the SNE schedule for
entrepreneur i alive in t such that sector i =2 At 1 is plotted). In Figure 1.(b) and 2.(b) the
parameters conguration leads always (i.e., for all values of nt 1) to unique SNE.17 On the other
hand, in Figure 2.(a) multiple equilibria emerge for values of nt 1 2 (bn; n). Two equilibria are
possible in this case: one where t = 0, and another one in which t > 0. Bear in mind that, as
it can be deduced from Corollary 2, for any nt 1  n, the SNE must necessarily be unique and
16 In what follows I restrict the analysis only to stable SNE.
17A su¢ cient condition for uniqueness of SNE is that: @

@
_

=   
0() 	0_

00() 	(n;
_
 )
< 1, 8n 2 [0; 1] and _  0.
Generally speaking, uniqueness requires R&D externalities not to be too strong, so that the curves plotted on
Figure 1.b never cross the 45 line from below see Cooper and John (1988).
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encompass t = 0. Furthermore, for values of nt 1 su¢ ciently close to 1, the SNE must also
necessarily be unique (since limn!1	0_ = 0); but comprising 

t > 0 (because 0 < n < 1).
4.3 A Short Digression about the Equilibrium under Full Information
Suppose information about entrepreneurial skills were complete. In equilibrium, each type would
be charged an interest rate that accurately reects his intrinsic failure risk. In particular, good
types would face a (net) interest rate equal to Rf = 0 and thus would achieve UFIg  f(k(0)) 
k(0). On the other hand, bad types would face an interest equal to rmax = (1  p)=p, obtaining
UFIb  pf(k(rmax))  k(rmax). Let FI 
 
UFIg   UFIb

, and notice that FI > (0), which
is the maximum value that (r) could possibly reach according to Lemma 2. Therefore, the
talent premium (FI) and the incentives to undertake R&D are largest when informational
frictions preventing good types from receiving rst-best credit contracts are absent. Moreover,
notice that FI does not depend on the value of nt (in other words, it does not depend on the
technology available in the economy at time t).
5 Aggregate Dynamic Analysis
The analysis in Section 3 has been conducted within a static framework (the set At was taken
as given). Section 4 provides the bridge between the static and the dynamic analysis of the
economy, by introducing the optimal R&D e¤ort choice. Here, I present the dynamics of At.
Since agents are born with zero initial wealth and all sectors are (ex-ante) symmetric, nt turns
out to be the only variable whose behaviour we need to study in order to keep track of the
dynamics of the economy.
Denition 1 (Dynamic Equilibrium) A dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of: R&D e¤ort
choices fi;tgj2[0;1], entrepreneurial allocations f(rj ; lj); ki;j : i 2 Atgj2[0;1], and o¤ered credit
contracts Ct, linked together over time by the law of motion of nt specied in (11).
Law of Motion: nt = nt 1 + (t )(1  nt 1); (11)
where t denotes the R&D e¤ort by entrepreneur h 2 [0; 1] alive in t when sector h =2 At 1,
resulting from the SNE in Section 4.2.
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5.1 Stagnation vs. Development (Multiple Dynamic Equilibria)
This subsection investigates the characteristics of the dynamic paths followed by economies that
di¤er in terms of their initial conditions. In particular, it studies whether economies may follow
divergent dynamic paths, reaching di¤erent long-run equilibria. For this reason, I impose here
the following condition on the parameters conguration (so that the SNE in R&D e¤ort will
always be unique, leading to a situation as the one in Figure 2.b).
Assumption 3 (su¢ cient condition for uniqueness of SNE).
@
@
_

=   
0()	0_

00()	(n;
_
 )
< 1, for all n 2 [0; 1] and _  0:
Proposition 3 (Stagnation vs. Development) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then:
(i) Any economy that starts o¤ with n0  n remains forever at n0 and displays no innovation
activities. That is, if n0  n, then: nt = n0 for all t  0, while t = 0 for all t > 0.
(ii) In any economy in which n0 > n, nt will continuously grow over time, converging monoton-
ically to n1 = 1.
Secular Stagnation: Take an economy for which n0  n. The equilibrium in t = 1 encompasses
1 = 0. In addition to zero R&D e¤ort and absence of innovations, this economy will exhibit
highly ine¢ cient credit contracts to talented entrepreneurs and low levels of entrepreneurial
investment. From (11), since 1 = 0, then n1 = n0. This implies that 2 = 0 will hold again at
t = 2, in turn leading to n2 = n1 = n0. Furthermore, in the absence of any substantial exogenous
shock, this stagnant equilibrium will perpetuate itself for all t 2 f0; 1; :::1g.
Prosperity and Development: Consider now an economy for which n0 > n. In this case, the
equilibrium at t = 1 displays 1 > 0. Intuitively, since n is relatively large, the adverse selection
problem faced by talented entrepreneurs does not become too serious, and the operation of the
economy does not turn out to be so severely distorted (in particular, innovation activities do
not fully disappear as the talent premium remains su¢ ciently high).
From (11), 1 > 0 implies that some additional sectors become active during t = 1. As a
result, n1 > n0 > n, and 2 > 1 > 0. Moreover, this prosperous dynamics will perpetuate ad
innitum, and this economy will eventually reach a long-run equilibrium characterised by all sec-
tors being active (n1 = 1). During the transition period, the economy experiences development
and growth; this manifests itself as a process of progressive sectoral di¤erentiation and better
sorting of entrepreneurial skills. At the same time, nancial market operation concomitantly
improves, as adverse selection problems a¤ecting the talent premium tend to vanish as nt rises.
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5.2 History vs. Expectations (Multiple Static Equilibria)
Section 4.2 has shown that, within the range of nt 1 2 (n; 1), for some set of parameters
congurations the model might display multiple SNE in R&D e¤ort. As a particular example,
in Figure 2.a, for nt 1 2 [n^; n], where n^ 2 (n; n), we nd two possible (stable) SNE. This will
lead to multiplicity of static equilibria in this model. It is beyond the scope of this paper to study
this sort of equilibrium multiplicity, as the main intention here is to analyse how dynamic paths
may depend on the initial conditions. Nevertheless, below I provide a brief discussion of the
equilibrium characteristics of an economy whose parameters conguration leads to a situation
as the one depicted in Figure 2.a.
In a situation like the one in Figure 2.a, then if the value of n0 2 [n^; n], this economy will
be subject to multiple static equilibria. Equilibrium multiplicity will be driven by expectations.
In particular, if expectations coordinate in
_
 1 = 0, then 1 = 0 will prevail. Besides this "bad"
equilibrium, we can observe that there also exists some specic value
_


1 > 0, which would
lead to a "better" equilibrium comprising 1 =
_


1 > 0. More importantly, from a dynamic
perspective, whether expectations in t = 1 lead to 1 = 0 or 1 > 0 may carry dramatic future
consequences. Dynamically, 1 = 0 entails that nt stays stagnant during period t = 1; as a result,
initial conditions in t = 2 would identically replicate those faced in t = 1, with the economy still
at risk of su¤ering from coordination failures. On the other hand, 1 > 0 means that n1 > n0
and, consequently, this could possibly shoot up n1 above n, and ignite a process of continuous
prosperity and development thereafter. For an economy with nt 1 2 [n^; n], the larger nt 1 is,
the higher the chances that nt > n will hold if t > 0. Hence, within [n^; n], both history and
expectations matter in the sense of Krugman (1991), and the economy might display periods of
growth and technical change, followed by periods of stagnation.
6 Incorporating Wealth into the Model
So far it has been supposed that individuals are born with zero initial wealth. In many aspects
this assumption might seem far too extreme. Nevertheless, the zero initial wealth assumption
has allowed the model to fully isolate the impact of the fraction of active sectors on the operation
of the economy.
In this section, I let agents be born with positive initial wealth; furthermore, I allow initial
wealth to di¤er across individuals of the same cohort. Individuals are warm-glow altruistic and,
accordingly, bequeath a fraction of their net life-time income to their o¤spring (this bequest will
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constitute the next generations initial wealth). In short, this section shows that none of the
main results and insights presented earlier are altered when we permit agentsinitial wealth to
be positive, stemming from parental bequests.
Let wi;t denote the initial wealth of the type i alive in period t. Initial wealth is assumed
publicly observable, and is distributed in the population of entrepreneurs according to the cu-
mulative distribution function 
t(w). Since types are assumed to be intergenerationally uncor-
related, then, in a steady state, initial wealth and types will turn out to be uncorrelated as well
(accordingly, the specic value of wi;t will provide no information about the is type).
6.1 The Participation Constraint
When initial wealth is positive we need to take care of the participation constraint (PC ) in the
credit market. In particular, when w > 0 a bad type might prefer not to engage in any credit
market transaction, and behave as if he were in complete autarky, since he may now invest a
positive amount of capital (k  w) in a project, without the need to borrow.
Suppose a bad type with initial wealth w must choose his portfolio allocation in autarky. In
such case, he will solve:
max
0kw
: p f(k) + (w   k):
This optimisation problem yields the following investment policies: i) k = w if w  kB; ii)
k = kB if w > k

B. Where f
0(kB) = p
 1 (i.e., kB is the bad typesrst-best investment level).
Imagine now that this bad type decides to participate in the credit market. In this case, he
will invest kP (r) units of capital in the project, paying an interest rate r on the borrowed amount
(kP (r) w); where r corresponds to the interest rate that would hold in a pooling equilibrium.
The function kP (r) stems form the rst-order condition f
0(kP ) = 1 + r; analogous to (3) in the
main model. Notice that 1 + r  p 1, hence kP (r)  kB.
A bad type will participate in the credit market only if his PC is not violated; this requires
that: p [f(kP (r))  (1 + r)(kP (r)  w)]  pf(kB)+(w kB), for w > kB.18 From this condition,
it follows that a he will participate in the credit market if and only if his initial wealth does not
surpass the threshold bw(r) 2 (kB; kP (r)); that is, if and only if w < bw(r), where:
bw(r)  p [f(kP (r))  f(kB)  (1 + r)kP (r)] + kB
1  p(1 + r) :
18The participation constraint also requires that: p [f(kP (r))  (1 + r)(kP (r)  w)]  pf(w), for all w  kB .
Nevertheless, this last condition never binds.
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6.2 The Incentive Compatibility Constraint
Take now an entrepreneur whose w  bw(r). If he is a good type, he must get a separating credit
contract (paying an interest rate equal to Rf = 0), as no bad type with w  bw(r) desires to
participate in the credit market at the (pooling) interest rate r. Despite that, a good type with
w  bw(r) will not necessarily obtain a rst-best credit contract. For this to happen, an equally
rich bad type should nd no incentives to imitate the good-type rst-best behaviour. Denote with
kG the result deriving from the rst-order condition f
0(kG) = 1; i.e., k

G designates the rst-best
investment level of the good types. Notice that kG  kP (r), because 1+r  1. A good type will
thus receive a rst-best credit contract if and only if: p [f(kG)  (kG   w)] < pf(kB)+(w kB).
This last condition requires that his initial wealth is larger than the threshold ew 2 ( bw(r); kG);
that is, it calls for w > ew, where:
ew  p [f(kG)  f(kB)  kG] + kB
1  p :
What happens to a good type whose w 2 [ bw(r); ew]? This agent will certainly receive a
separating contract. However, he wont be able to get a rst-best contract, as this would violate
the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC ) of the bad types with identical w. In fact, the IC
will bind for those entrepreneurs whose w 2 [ bw(r); ew]. As a result, the credit contract received
by a good type with w 2 [ bw(r); ew] stems from the following condition:
p [f(kS)  (kS   w)] = pf(kB) + (w   kB): (12)
Equation (12) (implicitly) yields a function kS(w); which displays the following properties: (i)
dkS=dw =
1 p
p (f
0(kS)  1) 1 > 0, (ii) d2kS=(dw)2 > 0, and (iii) limw! ew kS(w) = kG.
Table 1 summarises the main features of the credit contracts o¤ered to entrepreneurs.19
Table 1: Equilibrium Contracts (main features)
w < bw(r) w 2 [ bw(r); ew] w > ew
type of credit contract pooling sub-optimal separating rst-best separating
investment by good types kP (r) k

S(w) k

G
interest rate (on credit) 0 < r < 1 pp 0 0
19The underlying reason why richer agents receive more favourable credit contracts is the following: since richer
agents have more of their own wealth at stake in the projects, their incentives are more closely aligned to those
of lenders. A similar characterisation of the equilibrium entrepreneurial credit contracts at di¤erent wealth levels
is present in Martin (2009), though in a static model.
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6.3 Entrepreneurial Consumption and Sketch of Dynamics
As in Section 3.3, denote by Ug (Ub) the expected income level achieved by a good type (bad
type). When initial wealth is incorporated into the model, it will naturally be the case that this
will depend on w as well  i.e., Ug = Ug(r; w) and Ub = Ub(r; w). Table 2 summarises how
entrepreneurial expected income depends on w (and r).
Table 2: Entrepreneurial Income Ug(r; w) and Ub(r; w).
w < bw(r) w 2 [ bw(r); ew] w > ew
good types f(kP (r))   (1 + r)(kP (r)  w) f(kS(w))  (kS(w)  w) f(kG)  (kG   w)
bad types p[f(kP (r))  (1 + r)(kP (r)  w)] pf(kB) +(w   kB) pf(kB) + (w   kB)
From the results presented in Table 2, this lemma follows.
Lemma 4 Let (r; w)  Ug(r; w)   Ub(r; w). Then: (i) () > 0, 8w; r  0; (ii) 0r() < 0,
8r  0 and w 2 [0; bw(r)]; (iii) a) 0w() > 0, 8w 2 [0; ew) and r  0; b) 0w() = 0, 8w  ew.
Lemma 4 represents the counterpart of Lemma 2, when entrepreneurs start their lives with
positive wealth. On the one hand, Lemma 4 shows that Lemma 2s key result 0r() < 0 holds
as well when 0 < w < bw(r). On the other hand, it shows that the surplus () is (weakly)
increasing in w, which implies that richer entrepreneurs benet from a larger nt more than
poorer entrepreneurs do. Furthermore, recall that the larger () is, the higher the incentives
to R&D (Lemma 3 and Proposition 2). Therefore, 0w() > 0 entails that, for a given value
of nt which, following Proposition 1, determines r(nt), the aggregate distortions generated
by the adverse selection problem in the credit market will become less severe the wealthier the
economy is. Figure 3 plots the surplus (r; w) against w at four di¤erent values of r (namely:
1=p > rH > rL > 0), to illustrate Lemma 4.20
From a dynamic perspective, notice nally that economies exhibiting a larger nt tend to be
richer as well. This is the case because the larger the fraction of active sectors, the higher the
average productivity in the economy. As a result, introducing wealth dynamics into the model
(by means of bequests, or any other reason that would still generate positive serial correlation in
wt) will not invalidate any of the main ndings of this paper. In fact, as nt and wealth a¤ect the
20Recall r = p 1 when n = 0; and r = 0 when n = 1. Additionally, notice bw0(r) < 0, where lim
r!p 1
bw(r) = kB
and lim
r!0
bw(r) = ew:
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economys performance in the same direction, the presence of bequests will actually reinforce
the dynamics previously discussed in Section 5.
Figure 3: (r; w) against w at four di¤erent levels of r.
6.4 Dynamics with Positive Bequests
Suppose preferences over income are given by Ui;t = c1 i;t b

i;t, where ci;t denotes the consumption
of agent i alive in t, bi;t represents the bequest left to his o¤spring, and  2 (0; 1). Given
those preferences, individuals will optimally bequeath a fraction  of their lifetime income to
their o¤spring. The amount bi;t will in turn fully determine the initial wealth of is son; i.e.,
wi;t+1 = bi;t. Henceforth, we split the population of entrepreneurs in lineages indexed by the
letter i 2 [0; 1]. Since types are intergenerationally uncorrelated, the initial wealth transition
equations for any lineage i of entrepreneurs are given by:
wi;t+1 =
8<:  [f(kP (rt))  (1 + rt)(kP (rt)  wi;t)] with Pr = nt + p(1  nt)0 with Pr = (1  p)(1  nt) if wi;t < bw(rt)
wi;t+1 =
8>><>>:
 [f(kS(wi;t))  kS(wi;t) + wi;t] with Pr = nt
 [f(kB)  kB + wi;t] with Pr = p(1  nt)
 [wi;t   kB] with Pr = (1  p)(1  nt)
if wi;t 2 [ bw(rt); ew]
wi;t+1 =
8>><>>:
 [f(kG)  kG + wi;t] with Pr = nt
 [f(kB)  kB + wi;t] with Pr = p(1  nt)
 [wi;t   kB] with Pr = (1  p)(1  nt)
if wi;t > ew
When w is linked across generations by bequests, the dynamics of the economy can no longer
be solely determined by the value of nt but also depend on the initial wealth distribution 
t(w).
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In particular, the economys dynamic path is now dictated by the following system:
nt = nt 1 +Bt (1  nt 1) (13)

t+1(w) =  t [
t(w)] : (14)
Where:
Bt =
Z

t(w)
 ((rt; w)) d
t(w) (15)
and
(rt; w) = argmax

f()(rt; w)  g (16)
Remark. Here we continue assuming that the NE of the R&D e¤ort game is always unique (or,
alternatively, that coordination failures, never actually arise). Accordingly, from (15) and (16),
abusing a bit of the notation, we could write Bt = Bt (rt(nt 1);
t(w)) = Bt (nt 1;
t(w)).
The operator  t [] maps the initial wealth distribution prevailing in period t into the initial
wealth distribution holding in t+1, based on the transition equations specied above. Notice that
this operator changes over time, since the transition equations and their associated occurrence
probabilities both depend on the value of nt. Additionally, the dynamic behaviour of nt is
a¤ected by 
t(w) through (15). These two features of the dynamic system described by (13)
and (14) make it non-stationary and highly complicated to study. However, the most important
general results can be proven without much di¢ culty.
Lemma 5 (i) Consider two di¤erent initial wealth distributions 
t(w) and 
0t(w), and suppose

t(w) rst-order stochastically dominates 
0t(w) henceforth denoted as 
t(w)  
0t(w). Then:
Bt (nt 1;
t(w))  Bt (nt 1;
0t(w)).
(ii) Consider two economies (A and B) with identical initial wealth distribution, i.e. 
At (w) =

Bt (w) = 
t(w). Suppose also that n
A
t > n
B
t . Then: 

A
t+1(w)  
Bt+1(w).
Lemma 5 (i) states that, all other things equal, wealthier economies tend to undertake more
R&D and innovate more accordingly; its underlying intuition is straightforward from Lemma
4.21 On the other hand, Lemma 5 (ii) says that economies with a larger fraction of active sectors
tend to be richer too. The reason for this result lies in two combined e¤ects: rst, a higher nt
means that more agents are able to nd a sector in which they have a comparative advantage,
21Notice that given the shape of (r; w) as plotted in Figure 3, we cannot say much about the e¤ect of higher
moments of 
t(w) on t . In particular, since (r; w) has initially a convex segment (with respect to w), followed
by a concave segment, the e¤ect on t of subjecting 
t(w) to a mean-preserving spread is ambiguous.
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increasing the average productivity in the economy; second, a higher nt leads to the provision
of better credit contracts to the good types, spurring thus entrepreneurial investment. Lemma
5 thus formally proves that introducing wealth dynamics into the model (through bequests
motives) reinforces the dynamics that have been described before in Section 5.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, where we should now interpret 	(nt 1; t ) =
(rt (nt 1; t ); 0), and let 
 ew (
0) denote the degenerate distribution function in which wi = ew
(wi = 0) for all i 2 [0; 1]. Then:
(i) If nt 1 > n, nt will converge monotonically to n1 = 1, regardless of 
t(w).
(ii) Suppose 
t(w) = 
 ew. Then, there exists n ew < n such that if nt 1 > n ew, nt will converge
monotonically to n1 = 1
(iii) Suppose 
0  
t(w)  
 ew. Then, 9 n
(w) 2 [n ew; n] such that if nt 1 > n
(w), nt will
converge monotonically to n1 = 1. Furthermore, consider 
t(w)  
0t(w), then n
(w)  n
0(w).
Proposition 4 rstly shows that the main result in Proposition 3 still holds true when we
incorporate standard wealth dynamics into the model when nt is su¢ ciently large, the econ-
omy embarks in a process of long-run development, regardless of the wealth distribution in t.
Secondly, it shows that initial wealth acts as a partial substitute for nt. This last result stems
from the fact that both nt and wt contribute to alleviate adverse selection problems in the credit
market. Notice that Proposition 4 (ii) and (iii) imply that the minimum degree of sectoral
variety needed to guarantee long-run growth turns out to be smaller the richer the economy is.
This result can be interpreted as saying that the importance of sectoral diversication as a factor
improving the operation of nancial markets is relatively higher at initial stages of development,
and tends to decrease as the economy develops and becomes wealthier.
7 Further Discussion: Some Stylised Facts in the Data
This section briey reviews some stylised patterns regarding the degree of sectoral diversication,
nancial development and entrepreneurial risk at di¤erent stages of development, consistent with
the main predictions of the model.
7.1 Sectoral Diversication and Development
The model predicts that the variety of sectors expands as economies grow and develop. Using
a panel of 67 countries, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) nd that sectoral concentration drastically
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falls at early stages of development, following a U-shape relationship with respect to income per
head. In particular, the authors conclude is that, along the development path, economies initially
experience a long process of sectoral diversication, which eventually reaches a maximum beyond
where the process begins to revert.
Given the implications of my model, two observations concerning Imbs-Wacziargs ndings
are worth stressing here: rst, the turning point in the diversication process tends to occur at
relatively high levels of income per capita (the authors argue that this point is located roughly
at the income per head of Ireland in 1992); second, the eventual re-concentration process only
partially o¤sets the e¤ect of the initial diversication phase.
The Non-monotonic Diversication Path: The non-monotonic relationship found by Imbs and
Wacziarg (2003) is also in itself an interesting result to somehow relate to the model. Although,
strictly speaking, this paper does not lead to U-shaped dynamics, the results in Section 6 can
yet shed some light on an interesting avenue for future research to contribute to explain such
non-monotonicity. That section has shown that sectoral variety is most relevant to alleviate
informational frictions at early stages of development. Then, as the economy grows and ac-
cumulates wealth, the use of collateral can actually substitute for the improved self-selection
of skills allowed by sectoral variety. As a consequence, one may well expect that if there also
exist gains from regional specialisation (such as increasing returns to scale), at some point in
the development path, economies might nd it worthwhile to sacrice some degree of sectoral
variety in order to better exploit increasing returns to scale.
7.2 Financial Development, Growth and Diversication
Starting with the seminal work by Goldsmith (1969) a large body of empirical literature has
systematically documented a positive association between the level of nancial development
and economic growth. In particular, several cross-country studies have argued for positive
causal e¤ect from di¤erent measures of nancial deepening on economic growth and capital
accumulation; e.g., King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Rajan
and Zingales (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998). Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest that
the e¢ ciency of nancial markets is especially critical to the protability of rms subject to
more severe asymmetric information problems (see discussion in Levine (1997), page 715).
The above literature is in general silent as to what actually determines the level of nancial
development of a specic economy. This paper suggests that this is crucially related to the
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degree of productive diversication via the improved matching of skills to activities it allows.
Given that diversication is itself endogenous to the process of development, nding a causal
e¤ect requires the use of some source of exogenous variation for sectoral variety. In that regard,
Ramcharan (2010) shows a positive and signicant e¤ect of sectoral diversication on nancial
deepening, using countriestopographical characteristics to instrument for diversication.22
Naturally, this last piece of evidence would also be also consistent with other explanations
for why diversication helps nancial development: for example, those suggested by Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997), Saint-Paul (1992) or Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). One specic re-
sult of my model, not present in those, is that also the returns to innovation rise with the
degree of diversication, hence sectoral variety should spur innovation activities and technical
change. Consistent with this last prediction, Feldman and Audretsch (1999) nd that innovation
activities tend to be lower in US cities that display a larger degree of industry specialisation.23
7.3 Allocation of Talent, Growth and Firm-Level Volatility
The model predicts that, as the variety of activities expands, thereby improving the quality of
matches between entrepreneurial skills and activities, entrepreneurial risk and output volatility
at the rm level should decline.24 Evidence of secular decline in rm-level volatility is presented
by Davis et al (2006) who study the evolution of output growth variability of privately held
rms in US during years 1976-2001. Relatedly, Koren and Tenreyro (2008) present evidence
linking productivity of rms and their output variability, showing that as rms become more
productive they also become less volatile.25
22The author uses the Gini coe¢ cients of the distribution of land area by elevation and by bioclimatic classes
to measure the degree of topographic variety of economies, and then uses these measures to instrument the degree
of productive diversication.
23There exists also some evidence that relates the degree of productive diversication and innovation intensity
at the rm level: e.g., Grabowski (1968), Scherer (1984), Garcia-Vega (2006). They tend to nd a positive
correlation between productive diversication within the rm and innovation intensity by the rm.
24This prediction di¤ers from that delivered by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), where rm-level volatility actu-
ally rises as sectoral variety expands over the process of development, since improved insurance against idiosyn-
cratic risks enabled by sectoral diversication induces entrepreneurs to invest in riskier activities. On the other
hand, Acemoglu-Zilibotti predicts that aggregate volatility in the economy should fall with development, while
my paper cannot deliver this result due to the assumed continuum of agents which, by construction, averages out
idiosyncratic shocks.
25Koren and Tenreyro (2008) also propose a theoretical model to explain the decline in rm-level volatility
along development. Their model relies on the idea that, as rms grow they increase the variety of inputs they
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The model presented here also suggests that rm-level volatility and nancial development
should be negatively correlated. A recent paper by Correa and Suarez (2009) ties the decline in
rm-level volatility to the operation of nancial markets. They show that, following an increase
in banking operation in some US states due to changes in their regulations, the types of rms
that experience the largest fall in output variability are those which tend to rely more strongly
on external funding.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a theory in which the e¢ ciency of nancial markets is a key condition
for growth and development. I have suggested that an expanding variety of sectors may be
an important factor leading to nancial development. In particular, this theory has stressed a
side e¤ect associated with the innovation process that had not been explored before, but which
could exert a signicant impact on development. Innovation activities can lead to a reduction
of frictions in the nancial markets and foster nancial development, because by expanding the
variety of productive activities, they concomitantly facilitate the allocation of skills, and thereby
alleviate adverse selection problems faced by talented entrepreneurs.
The core model that illustrates this theory has made use of several simplifying assumptions.
An assumption that may seem particularly worrying is the fact that individuals are born with
no initial wealth. In that regard, Section 6 has shown that none of the models main ndings
are a¤ected if we let agents be born with positive wealth. Despite not altering its main results,
introducing wealth may carry some interesting additional implications within a more general
model. Imagine that we gave room for increasing returns to scale and international trade. If
sectoral diversication really matters as a mechanism to solve adverse selection only at early
stages of development (as suggested by Section 6), then in the presence of increasing returns, at
some point in the development path, economies might nd it worthwhile to reverse the diversi-
cation tendency and start re-specialising in some specic sectors. This argument, which would
be consistent with the evidence found by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) of a U-shape relationship
between sectoral diversication and income per head, is left open for future research.
Another feature that deserves further discussion is the behaviour of nancial intermediaries.
In the model, nanciers respond "passively" to the environment. However, it can be argued that
utilise (they call this process technological diversication), which by the law of large numbers helps to mitigate
the e¤ect of input-specic shocks on rms output.
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the operation of the nancial system improves during development not only because frictions are
alleviated, but also because the screening capacity of the nanciers gets better. The paper has
abstracted from the latter aspect. One remark concerning this omission is worth noting, though.
The amount of screening e¤ort is itself an endogenous choice, and it will certainly be inuenced
by the cost of screening. This paper states that screening e¤ort is eased by sectoral variety, as
this allows heterogeneous agents to self-select better. However, this does not necessarily imply
that richer economies should conduct less credit screening than poorer ones. In fact, as sectoral
variety decreases the cost of screening, in some cases, more screening e¤ort could be the optimal
response by lenders to the new environment, rather than simply denying credit so as to avoid
the screening cost fully.
From a policy perspective, an important implication concerns poverty-alleviation programmes.
Section 5 has shown that some economies might get stuck in a peculiar type of poverty trap.
This is the result of a "deep-rooted" organisational failure, a¤ecting several markets at the same
time. Underdevelopment is characterised by few sectors in which individuals can specialise,
ine¢ cient nancial markets, and scant innovation e¤ort. The market failure contaminating the
operation of the economy stems from the incapacity of some individuals to nd an activity for
which they are comparatively talented. Most theories on poverty traps imply that economies
can be easily rescued from poverty by receiving a su¢ ciently large wealth transfer. In contrast,
my theory suggests that poverty-alleviation policies should also aim at facilitating the matching
of skills and technologies, as standard wealth transfers alone might not su¢ ce to suppress the
adverse selection problem (at least in a reasonably short time frame).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Take two di¤erent credit contracts (l; r) 2 R+R+ and (~l; ~r) 2 R+R+,
such that f 0(k = l)  1 and f 0(k = ~l)  1.26 Hence, in equilibrium, all the amount that is
borrowed will be invested in the entrepreneurial projects. Accordingly, lets denote: k = l and
~k = ~l. Assume that:
f(k)  (1 + r)k > f(~k)  (1 + ~r)~k (17)
Then, from (17), if type i decides to specialise in sector i 2 A, he will prefer contract (k; r) to
contract (~k; ~r).
Take now type j. Since sector j =2 A, he will specialise (indi¤erently) in any sector h 2 [0; 1],
such that sector h 2 A. Given limited liability, type j will (weakly) prefer contract (~k; ~r) to
contract (k; r), if and only if:
p[f(~k)  (1 + ~r)~k]  p [f(k)  (1 + r)k] (18)
But, since p > 0, (18) contradicts (17). Hence, it cannot be true that, while type i prefers
contract (k; r) to contract (~k; ~r), type j prefers (~k; ~r) to (k; r) instead. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The expression in (6) follows from the previous discussion in Section
3.2. Then, di¤erentiating (6) with respect to nt: drt =dnt =   (1  p) [nt + (1  nt)p] 2 < 0: 
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume that the entrepreneur i alive in t expends i units of e¤ort. If he
manages to generate an innovation, then from Lemma 2 it follows that his expected consumption
will rise by (rt ). Making use of Proposition 1, we can write (rt ) = (r(nt))  e(nt), wheree0(nt) = 0()drtdnt > 0 (from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2). How is the value nt determined?
Suppose all entrepreneurs belonging to  A it 1 choose
_
 t. Since active sectors in t   1 never
revert to inactive in t, and recalling (9), then:
nt = nt 1 + (1  nt 1)(
_
 t)  (nt 1;
_
 t) (19)
Notice that, because (
_
 t) is bounded away from 1, (19) implies  () is increasing in both nt 1
and
_
 t. Now, plugging  () from (19) into e(nt); we can rewrite e((nt 1;_ t))  	(nt 1;_ t).
From where it follows that: (i)	0n = e0(nt) (1 (_ t))nt 1 > 0; (ii)	0 = e0(nt) (1 nt 1)0(_ t),
which leads to 	0 > 0 if nt 1 2 [0; 1) and 	0 = 0 if nt 1 = 1. Finally, since entrepreneur i
26 It must be straightforward to notice that entrepreneurs only borrow in order to nance entrepreneurial
investment. Therefore, in equilibrium, they would never borrow beyond the point f 0(k) = 1.
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will succeed in innovating for sector i with probability (i), we may write: i;t(i; nt 1;
_
 t) =
(i) 	(nt 1;
_
 t)  i; which is the expression in Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1). Consider two values of nt 1; n0; n1 2 [0; 1], such that
n0 < n1. Denote: 0  i (n0;
_
 t) and 1  i (n1;
_
 t); where
_
 t  0. Finally, suppose 0 > 1.
Thus, from (10), it follows that:
0(1)	(n1;
_
 t)  0(0)	(n0;
_
 t): (20)
Since, 00() < 0, when 0 > 1, 
0(0) < 
0(1). As a result, (20) necessarily requires that:
	(n0;
_
 t) > 	(n1;
_
 t), which contradicts 	0nt 1 > 0 for all
_
 t  0 in Lemma 3. Consequently,
n0 < n1 ) 0  1.
Part 2). Take two values of
_
 ;
_
 a;
_
 b 2 R+, such that
_
 a >
_
 b. Denote: a  i (nt 1;
_
 a) and
b  i (nt 1;
_
 b); where nt 1 2 [0; 1]. Finally, suppose a < b . Then, from (10), it follows that:
0(a)	(nt 1;
_
 a)  0(b)	(nt 1;
_
 b): (21)
In addition to that, 00() < 0 implies that, if a < b , then 
0(a) > 
0(b). As a result, (21)
necessarily requires: 	(nt 1;
_
 a) < 	(nt 1;
_
 b), which contradicts 	0 > 0 for all nt 2 [0; 1) (and
	0 = 0 when nt = 1), in Lemma 3. Therefore,
_
 a >
_
 b ) a  b . 
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) Since 	0n() > 0, setting
_
 t = 0 we obtain: 0(0)	(nt 1; 0) 
0(0)	(n; 0) = 1, for all nt 1  n. 8 Thus, given 00() < 0 and the conditions stated in (10),
0(0)	(nt 1; 0)  1 entails that i = 0 must hold for any value of nt 1  n when
_
 t = 0:
(ii) Since 	0n() > 0, it follows that: 0(0)	(nt 1; 0) > 0(0)	(n; 0) = 1, for allnt 1 > n:
Therefore, given 00() < 0, 0(0)	(nt 1; 0) > 1 implies that i > 0 must necessarily hold for
any nt 1 > n when
_
 t = 0, so that to comply with (10). Finally, since 	0_ ()  0,
0(0)	(nt 1;
_
 t)  0(0)	(nt 1; 0) > 0(0)	(n; 0) = 1, for all nt 1 > n and
_
 t > 0.
Hence, in order to comply with (10), i > 0 must hold for all nt 1 > n and
_
 t  0. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Since 	0_

()  0, then: 0(0)	(nt 1;1)  0(0)	(nt 1;
_
 t), for all
values of
_
 t  0 and nt 1 2 [0; 1]. As a result, if 0(0)	(n;1) = 1, it must be the case that:
0(i)	(nt 1;
_
 t)  0(0)	(nt 1;1)  1, 8nt 1  n; and i;
_
 t > 0.
Thus, given (10), it follows that i = 0 must hold for all nt 1  n and
_
 t  0. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Take an economy in which n0  n and focus on equilibrium
t = 1. Given Assumption 1, Corollary 1 implies there must exist a SNE in which 1 = 0. On the
other hand, Assumption 3 entails that this SNE is unique. Since (0) = 0, then (11) implies
that n1 = n0  n. As a result, in t = 2 conditions in the R&D e¤ort game remain identical
to those in t = 1; thus, 2 = 0 represents again the unique SNE in t = 2. Repeating the same
argument ad innitum, it follows that: nt = n0 8t  0 and t = 0 8t > 0.
(ii) Take an economy where n0 > n and focus on t = 1. Given Assumption 1, Corollary 1 implies
that 1(n0; 0) > 0. As a result, there must necessarily exist a SNE in t = 1 in which 1 > 0.
Given Assumption 3, then this 1 > 0 represents the unique SNE. Since 1 > 0, from (11) it
follows that n1 = n0 + (1)(1   n0); hence, n1 > n0. In particular, this leads to n1 > n0 > n.
Proposition 2 then implies that 2 > 1 > 0. As a result of this, n2 > n1. Repeating this
argument ad innitum, we can observe that: n < n0 < n1 < n2 < ::: < n1. Furthermore, since
(t )(1  nt 1)! 0 as nt ! 1, and because (t )(1  nt 1) is bounded away from zero for any
nt 1 2 [0; 1) and t > 0; then it follows that lim
t!1nt = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) Since (rt; w) in (16) is non-decreasing in w and () is increasing
in , it follows that  ((rt; w)) is non-decreasing in w. As a result, if 
t(w)  
0t(w), then it
must be the case that
R

t(w)
 ((rt; w)) d
t(w) 
R


0
t(w)
 ((rt; w)) d

0
t(w): 
(ii) We need to prove the following: for all w  0, and for all nA; nB 2 [0; 1], such that nA > nB:
then, 8x  0, P  w; [0; x] j nB  P  w; [0; x] j nA; where P (w; [0; x] j n) denotes the probability
that when wt = w, then wt+1 2 [0; x], conditional on nt = n.
Step 1: Suppose w 2 [0; bw(r)). Let y(nt; wt)   [f(kP (rt))  (1 + rt)(kP (rt)  wi;t)]; where
the fact that rt = r(nt) is taken into account when dening y(). Notice that @y=@nt > 0 and
@y=@wt = (1 + rt) > 0. Additionally, dene the following index-function:
Iy(n;w)<x =
8<: 1 if y(n;w) < x0 otherwise : (22)
Notice that, because @y=@n > 0, then the following two properties hold: 1) Iy(nA;w)<x = 1 )
Iy(nB ;w)<x = 1; 2) Iy(nB ;w)<x = 0 ) Iy(nA;w)<x = 0. Hence, if Iy(nB ;w)<x 6= Iy(nA;w)<x, it must
be the case that Iy(nB ;w)<x = 1 while Iy(nA;w)<x = 0. Using (22), thus:
P
 
w; [0; x] j nB  P  w; [0; x] j nA = (1  p)nB + p Iy(nB ;w)<x (23)
  (1  p)nA + p Iy(nA;w)<x + (1  p)(nA   nB):
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Hence, if Iy(nA;w)<x = 0, the right-hand side in (23) yields a strictly positive number. Alterna-
tively, if Iy(nA;w)<x = 1, then the right-hand side of (23) equals zero. Therefore, P
 
w; [0; x] j nB 
P
 
w; [0; x] j nA for all w 2 [0; bw(r)).
Step 2: Suppose w  bw(r). First, note that either if  [f(kS(w))  kS(w) + w] < x when w 2
[ bw(r); ew], or if  [f(kG)  kG(w) + w] < x when w > ew; then in both cases: P  w; [0; x] j nB =
P
 
w; [0; x] j nA = 1. Second, when the opposite results hold, three di¤erent cases may arise:
Case 1:  (w   kB) > x. Then, P
 
w; [0; x] j nB = P  w; [0; x] j nA = 0.
Case 2:  [f(kB)  kB + w] > x and  (w   kB) < x. Now, P (w; [0; x] j n) = (1   p)(1   n);
thus: P
 
w; [0; x] j nB  P  w; [0; x] j nA = (1  p)(nA   nB) > 0.
Case 3:  [f(kB)  kB + w] < x and  (w   kB) < x. Now, P (w; [0; x] j n) = (1   n); hence:
P
 
w; [0; x] j nB  P  w; [0; x] j nA = (nA   nB) > 0.
Therefore, as a result of all these four possible cases, we can deduce that: P
 
w; [0; x] j nB 
P
 
w; [0; x] j nA for all w  bw(r)) as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let  denote the set of all feasible distribution functions 
(w).
Suppose 
t(w) = 
0. Since nt 1 > n, then Bt > 0. Furthermore, since 
t(w)  
0 for any

t(w) 2 , then from Lemma 5 (i) it follows that: Bt > 0 for any 
t(w) 2 . Therefore,
nt > nt 1 > n, implying, in turn, that Bt+1 > 0 for any 
t+1(w) 2 . Repeating the same
argument ad innitum, the claimed result obtains. 
(ii) When nt 1 = n, we have that 0(0)(r; 0) = 1; where r = r(n). Thus, Bt (n;
0) = 0.
Furthermore, from (16) notice that t (r; ew) is the solution to:
0(t (r; ew))(r(nt); ew) = 1, where nt = n+ (1  n)(t (r; ew)) (24)
From Lemma 4, and the fact that r(nt)  r, it follows that (r(nt); ew) > (r; 0). Therefore, in
(24), t (r(n); ew) > 0must hold. Hence, there must exist 0 < n ew < n, such that t (r (n ew) ; ew) > 0
and n = n ew+(1 n ew)(t (r (n ew) ; ew)); from which it follows that if nt 1 > n ew when 
t(w) = 
 ew,
then nt will converge monotonically to n1 = 1. 
(iii) From Lemma 4 (i), it follows that: Bt (n;
t(w))  0 and Bt (n ew;
t(w))  Bt (n ew;
 ew). As
a result, there must exist n
(w) 2 [n ew; n], such that Bt (n
(w);
t(w))  0 and n = n
(w) + (1 
n
(w))B

t (n
(w);
t(w)); from which it follows that if nt 1 > n
(w) when 
t(w) holds, then nt
will converge monotonically to n1 = 1. Finally, applying Lemma 4 (i) again Bt (n
(w);
t(w)) 
Bt (n
(w);
0t(w)) obtains, from where n
(w)  n
0(w) if 
t(w)  
0t(w) immediately follows. 
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